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Abstract Visual search for feature targets was employed
to investigate whether the mechanisms underlying visual
selective attention are modulated by observers’ mood.
The effects of induced mood on overall mean reaction
times and on changes and repetitions of target-defining
features and dimensions across consecutive trials were
measured. The results showed that reaction times were
significantly slower in the negative than in the positive
and neutral mood groups. Furthermore, the results dem-
onstrated that the processing stage that is activated to
select visual information in a feature search task is
modulated by the observer’s mood. In participants with
positive or neutral moods, dimension-specific, but no
feature-specific, intertrial transition effects were found,
suggesting that these observers based their responses on
a salience signal coding the most conspicuous display
location. Conversely, intertrial effects in observers in a
negative mood were feature-specific in nature, suggest-
ing that these participants accessed the feature identity
level before responding.
Keywords Selective attention . Visual search . Mood
induction . Positive/negative mood . Salience . Object
identity
The ability to select the information conducive to current
behavioral goals and intentions from the abundance of
sensory stimuli provided by the environment is a key
human cognitive skill. Effects of mood on visual infor-
mation selection have been demonstrated in a series of
studies in which mainly tasks investigating space- and
object-based mechanisms of attentional selection have
been employed. In the present study, employing a visual
search task, the effects of mood on the processing mech-
anisms underlying feature-based selection were examined.
The basic question was whether previously described
mood-induced differences in selection processes would
be mirrored on the very basal level of dimension- and
feature-specific information selection. A specific tech-
nique (intertrial analysis) was applied in order to detect
potential differences in the levels of processing engaged
by observers in positive, negative, and neutral moods.
In a number of studies, mood-induced attentional biases
were investigated by means of global–local paradigms such
as Navon’s (1977) letter task, in which global or local
characteristics of large numerals composed of distinct small
numerals had to be categorized. As an example, Gasper and
Clore (2002, Exp.2) used Kimchi–Palmer figures (Kimchi
& Palmer, 1982), a variant of the Navon letter task. On each
trial, observers were shown geometric objects such as tri-
angles or squares that were composed of smaller triangles or
squares (e.g., four triangles making the shape of a square).
Then, participants were presented with a selection of two
objects, one of which corresponded to the shape of the local
elements of the object shown before (e.g., a triangle), while
the other object corresponded to its global shape (e.g., a
square). The task was to decide which of the two objects
looked similar to the object that was presented initially. The
results were straightforward: Participants in a negative
mood, as compared to observers in positive or neutral
moods, less often matched objects on the basis of the global
characteristic. Gasper and Clore’s finding is one example of
a general pattern that indicates that mood systematically
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affects visual information selection, suggesting that a
person in a positive mood tends to process global aspects of
visual stimuli, while a person in a negative mood tends to
process local aspects of visual information (e.g., Basso,
Schefft, Ris, & Dember, 1996; Derryberry & Reed, 1998;
Gasper & Clore; 2002). In keeping with the global–local
processing divide, it has been shown that the scope of focal
attention is modulated by a person’s mood: Negative mood
narrows the focus of attention, whereas positive mood results
in a broadened attentional focus (Christianson&Loftus, 1990;
Derryberry & Reed, 1998; Derryberry & Tucker, 1994;
Easterbrook, 1959; Fredrickson, 2004; Rowe, Hirsh, &
Anderson, 2007; for a comprehensive review, see Förster &
Dannenberg, 2010). As an example, Rowe et al. tested the
effect of mood on the scope of focal attention with the use of
Eriksen and Eriksen’s (1974) flanker task. After mood induc-
tion, participants were asked to identify, as quickly and accu-
rately as possible, a target letter that was presented at the
screen center and flanked by distractor letters at either side.
The target and flanker letters were selected from two sets, each
of which was associated with a predefined response. Flanker
letters were either compatible (i.e., they required the same
response as the response-relevant central letter) or incompat-
ible with the response indicated by the central letter. Eriksen
and Eriksen showed that reaction times (RTs) were signifi-
cantly slower in incompatible than in compatible trials; more-
over, the incompatibility effect was particularly strong when
the flanker letters were presented at a distance close to the
target letter. Rowe et al. found that, in the short target–flanker
distance condition, the distractor incompatibility effect was
significantly larger in participants in the positive as compared
to the negative and neutral mood conditions. Importantly, if
the target–flanker distance was increased, RTs in the
positive mood group remained high, whereas the incom-
patibility effect was reliably reduced in the groups with
neutral and negative moods. Rowe et al. concluded that
with a large focus of attention, the distracting informa-
tion from incompatible flanker letters was within the
spatial extent of focal attention, thus causing interfer-
ence with the relevant information at the level of re-
sponse selection in the positive mood condition. In
contrast, with narrow spatial attention, the flanker letters
appeared outside the focus of attention; that is, they
were deselected, and thus did not cause interference in
observers with negative mood.
In line with the findings described above, it was also
argued that the increased conceptual scope found in posi-
tive, relative to negative or neutral, affect leads to greater
cognitive flexibility in a variety of tasks (for an overview,
see Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999). For example, Van der
Stigchel, Imants, and Ridderinkhof (2011) showed in-
creased stimulus inhibition in participants in a positive
relative to those in a neutral mood in an antisaccade task
(requiring the inhibition of a saccade to the target location
and execution of an eye movement in the opposite direc-
tion). This result can be interpreted as enhanced top-down
control, in terms of more successful suppression of irrelevant
information in positive than in negative or neutral mood
conditions. Ashby and colleagues (Ashby et al., 1999;
Ashby, Valentin, & Turken, 2002) proposed a neuropsycho-
logical theory to account for the improved cognitive control
shown by observers in a positive mood. The authors assume
that during periods of positive affect, the release of dopamine
(mainly in the mesocorticolimbic system) is temporarily in-
creased, and that raised dopamine levels in the prefrontal
cortex entail greater cognitive flexibility. However, it was also
found that the increase in cognitive flexibility comes at the
cost of increased distractibility, which is reflected in, for
example, higher error rates in participants with positive than
with neutral or negative moods (Dreisbach, 2006; Dreisbach
& Goschke, 2004).
More recently, it has been shown that the relation-
ship between an observer’s affective state and the
scope of the attentional focus is more variable than
was originally assumed. As an example, Huntsinger
(in press) found evidence for a broadened attentional
spotlight in positive as compared to negative mood
(i.e., increased flanker incompatibility effects) only if
a global focus of attention was induced before the
flanker task (by having observers report only the global
numerals of Navon, 1977, stimuli). If, however, before
the flanker task, participants were perceptually primed
to adopt a local focus (by having them report only the
local numerals of Navon stimuli), the flanker incom-
patibility effects were decreased in the positive as
compared to the negative mood condition, reflecting a
narrowed attentional scope in the positive relative to a
broadened attentional focus in the negative mood con-
dition. Furthermore, if no scope of the attention focus
was made dominant (i.e., reporting equal proportions of
global and local numerals in Navon stimuli), affect
failed to modulate the spotlight of attention—there
were equally strong flanker incompatibility effects in
positive and negative moods. Huntsinger (in press; see
also Huntsinger, Clore, & Bar-Anan, 2010) concluded
that there is no dedicated link between affect and the
scope of the attentional focus. Rather, positive and
negative moods lead to opposed effects on the way
observers evaluate and validate their current thinking:
Positive mood serves as a go signal, encouraging the
use of the current mental content to focus on global or
local aspects when, respectively, a global or local focus
is relevant, therefore broadening or narrowing the spot-
light of attention accordingly. Conversely, negative
mood serves as a stop signal, discouraging the use of
the current mental content, so that observers focus on
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local details when a global focus is dominant, and on
global information when a local focus is dominant;
therefore, the attentional focus is narrowed or broadened
in contrast to the actual mental content. Huntsinger (in
press; see also Clore & Huntsinger, 2007) explained the
deviation of their results from earlier findings by
assuming that in a majority of the tasks used in the
earlier studies, a general tendency to adopt a global
focus was reinforced. This implies that positive mood
was always found to be associated with global informa-
tion processing (strengthening the current mental content
afforded by a global focus), whereas negative mood was
found to be associated with local information processing
solely (counteracting the mental content conveyed by a
global focus). Huntsinger et al.’s account is supported
by a series of studies showing that, although observers
are well able to switch between global and local pro-
cessing modes, in the default case, a global attention
focus is adopted (e.g., Kimchi, 1992; Kimchi & Palmer,
1982; Navon, 1977; Navon & Norman, 1983). In other
words, according to Huntsinger and colleagues, the
fixed effects of particular affective states on the atten-
tional focus in earlier studies were due to the fact that
the affective states had merged with the default mode of
global attention.
Furthermore, Gable and Harmon-Jones (2008, 2010)
showed that following the induction of positive mood in
participants with high approach motivation (i.e., present-
ing observers with food pictures and inducing expectan-
cies to receive the pictured food after the experiment),
the attentional scope was narrower than in participants
with low approach motivation (i.e., mere presentation of
food items without inducing expectancies to actually
receive this food). That is, the scope of attention fol-
lowing mood induction was modulated by an observer’s
motivational state. The concept of motivational intensity
bears a relationship to differences in the levels of arous-
al associated with particular affective states. Jefferies,
Smilek, Eich, and Enns (2008) showed that, in particu-
lar, the effects of negative mood critically depend on
the level of arousal. In an attentional blink task (iden-
tification of letters presented in a stream of digits in
rapid succession), accuracy was highest in participants
in a sad mood (negative affective state, low arousal),
lowest in anxious participants (negative affective state,
high arousal), and intermediate in calm and happy
observers (i.e., positive affective states and low or,
respectively, high arousal). In the present experiment,
we did not aim to introduce arousal as a dimension
detached from affect, and therefore induced a happy
mood as the positive affective state (with high arousal)
and sad mood as the negative affective state (with low
arousal). Induction of affective states—following the
recommendation of the Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross
(2007) film ratings catalogue—was achieved with the
use of film clips that scored particularly high on the
target emotions of either happiness or sadness, and
particularly low on other emotions, such as anger, fear,
or surprise. In the present experiment, potentially dis-
tinct effects of affect and arousal on levels of process-
ing were conflated (positive affect with high arousal and
negative affect with low arousal), and therefore need not
be discussed separately.
Dimension- and feature-based attentional selection
The studies discussed above aimed at investigating
mood-induced modulations of space-based (narrow vs.
broad attentional spotlight: Huntsinger, in press; Rowe
et al., 2007) or object-based (global vs. local processing
styles: Basso et al., 1996; Derryberry & Reed, 1998;
Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008, 2010; Gasper & Clore,
2002) mechanisms of attentional selection. However, in-
fluential theories of visual information selection have
proposed that attentional selection can also be controlled
by visual features such as color, orientation, size, and so
forth (Huang & Pashler, 2007; Treisman, 1988; Treisman
& Gelade, 1980), or by dimension-based salience activa-
tions generated from visual features (Fecteau & Munoz,
2006; Wolfe, 1994, 2007; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel,
1989). Investigations into the mechanisms underlying
feature-based attention commonly employ visual search
tasks in which observers are presented with arrays of
objects (nontargets) in which a target object may or
may not be embedded; participants are instructed to
indicate, as quickly and accurately as possible, whether
a target object is present or absent. In feature search
tasks, the target differs from the nontargets by one
salient feature, such as its color or orientation (e.g., a
red vertical or green tilted bar among green vertical
bars). Targets that may differ from distractors on one
of several different dimensions are referred to as feature
singletons. Wolfe (1994; Wolfe et al., 1989), in his
influential guided search (GS) model, proposed that
the allocation of focal attention (i.e., the detection of
the target in feature search tasks) is controlled by a so-
called salience representation (Crick, 1984; Koch &
Ullman, 1985). The information contained in the visual
field is used to derive topographically organized repre-
sentations of feature contrast or salience signals. These
representations code how dissimilar or similar, with
respect to a limited set of feature dimensions (e.g.,
color, orientation, etc.; see Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004),
a location in the visual field is relative to neighboring
locations. For example, a red vertical bar presented
Atten Percept Psychophys (2013) 75:41–52 43
among green vertical bars produces, at the location of
the red bar, high feature contrast activation in the color
dimension, but no feature contrast activation in the
orientation dimension. Feature contrast signals are ini-
tially coded in independent dimension-specific represen-
tations or maps before being integrated into a
supradimensional overall representation of salience. In
other words, the more dissimilar that a location is
compared to its neighboring locations, the higher is
the integrated salience representation for that location
(e.g., Krummenacher, Müller, & Heller, 2001, 2002).
Focal attention is directed to the most salient location
first, then to the next most salient location, and so forth.
The information at the attended location is gated to
higher-level processes of object recognition and re-
sponse generation. In feature search tasks, the only peak
in the salience activation is at the location of the target,
and focal attention is thus immediately directed to that
location. Phenomenally, the target seems to “pop out” of
the display.
However, it has been shown that search RTs on a
current trial are affected by the target properties of the
preceding trial (referred to as the intertrial or priming of
pop-out effect; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994, 1996).
More specifically, Found and Müller (1996) found that
search RTs for a red vertical target among green vertical
objects on trial n were expedited when the target on the
preceding trial n–1 was also red and vertical, as com-
pared to when the target was green and tilted.
Furthermore, they showed that only the target-defining
dimension (e.g., color or orientation), but not the target-
defining feature (e.g., red or blue, left- or right-tilted)
affects performance across consecutive trials. Stated dif-
ferently, changing the target dimension across trials (e.g.,
orientation on trial n–1, color on trial n) incurred an RT
cost relative to repeating the dimension (e.g., color on
n–1, color on n). By contrast, changing the target feature
across trials (e.g., blue on n–1, red on n) did not incur
any RT cost as compared to repeating the feature (e.g.,
red on n–1, red on n). The results suggest that in
singleton feature search, responses are based on
dimension-based salience signals; the exact featural iden-
tity of the target is not required for solving the task (i.e.,
to decide on the presence of absence of a feature target).
Found and Müller (1996) interpreted their finding in
terms of Müller and colleagues’ (Müller, Heller, & Ziegler,
1995; Müller, Reimann, & Krummenacher, 2003)
dimension-weighting (DW) account of visual search. As in
GS (Wolfe, 1994, 2007), dimension-based salience signals
indicate the presence of a target, but in contrast to GS, DW
assumes that the dimension-based salience signals need to
be weighted by allocating a limited-capacity resource
(attentional weight) to dimension-based processing
modules. An increase in the weight in a given dimensional
module (e.g., color) entails a reduction of the weights in other
modules (e.g., orientation). Importantly, the distribution of
attentional weights persists across trials. Therefore, if the
target in two consecutive trials is defined on the same dimen-
sion, no time-consuming shift of weight is required, and RTs
are thus faster than in sequences of trials that require a weight
shift following a change of the target-defining dimension. As
attentional weight operates at the level of dimension-based
modules, a change of the target feature within the dimension
does not affect the search RTs in detection tasks.
Extending Found andMüller’s (1996) work, Krummenacher,
Grubert, and Müller (2010) recently compared intertrial
effects in conditions requiring feature detection or feature
identification. In both conditions, participants had to decide
whether or not a target item was present in the search
display. In the feature detection task, they were presented
with search displays consisting of an array of nontarget
items (green vertical bars); on half of the trials, one of the
nontargets was replaced by a feature target (a red or blue
vertical or a green left-tilted or right-tilted bar). In the feature
identification task, participants were presented with an isolat-
ed item (i.e., there was no context of nontarget items), which
was defined by either a target (red, blue, left-tilted, or right-
tilted) or a nontarget (green vertical) feature. The results of
the detection condition mirrored earlier findings of intertrial
effects (Müller et al., 1995; Müller et al., 2003) and revealed
dimension-based but no feature-based intertrial effects.
Krummenacher et al. (2010) concluded that in the de-
tection task, the target was discerned on the basis of the
presence of a dimension-based salience signal; knowl-
edge of the actual feature identity was not necessary to
execute the correct response. By contrast, in the identi-
fication condition, feature-based intertrial effects were
observed (in addition to dimension-based effects), indi-
cating that participants needed to access the level of
feature identities to decide whether the display item (shown
in isolation) required a target or a nontarget response.
Furthermore, the overall RTs were slower in the identi-
fication than in the detection condition. The authors
reasoned that this RT cost was at least partially due to
the fact that in the identification relative to the detection
task, a perceptually finer-grained (and therefore more
time-consuming) analysis of the single display item
was required. To summarize, Krummenacher et al.
(2010) showed that dimension- and feature-specific in-
tertrial effects constitute a marker of the processing
level—salience differences or feature identities—at
which targets were processed. Processing at the level
of dimension-based salience signals entails dimension-
based, but not feature-based, intertrial effects, whereas
processing at the feature level is reflected by feature-
specific intertrial effects.
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Rationale of the study
The objective of the present study was to investigate the
effects of mood on feature-based mechanisms of atten-
tional information selection. Positive (happy), negative
(sad), or neutral mood was induced in observers prior
to their completion of a visual feature search task. We
examined the overall RTs and intertrial effects on RTs. In
object-based selection tasks (e.g., a Navon letter task,
Navon, 1977, or a Kimchi-Palmer figure task, Kimchi
& Palmer, 1982; see, e.g., Basso et al., 1996; Derryberry
& Reed, 1998; Gasper & Clore; 2002), it was found that
observers in a negative mood select local aspects of
objects—that is, visual information is processed at a
fine-grained level involving visual details—whereas
observers in positive and neutral moods select global
aspects of the objects—in other words, visual information
is processed at a more general level, ignoring details.
Translating these results to the concept of feature-based
selection suggests that observers in a negative mood
process visual items in a detailed way, corresponding to
the level of feature values (identities), whereas partici-
pants in positive and neutral moods process visual items
in a more perfunctory way, corresponding to the level of
dimension-based salience signals. If people in a negative
mood indeed access the representations of features, their
performance should benefit from repetitions, across con-
secutive trials, of the exact target-defining feature, and
performance should be impaired when the target-defining
feature changes across trials. RT benefits and costs would
be reflected in feature-based intertrial effects (see
Krummenacher et al., 2010). In marked contrast, partic-
ipants in positive and neutral moods should show no
feature-based, but only dimension-based, intertrial effects,
as, according to the DW account (Müller et al., 1995;
Müller et al., 2003), their target-present responses are
based on the presence of a peak of salience activation
in one of the dimensional modules. Furthermore, we
expected the overall mean RTs to be equally fast for
observers in positive and neutral moods, but slower for
observers in negative as compared to positive or neutral
mood. Accessing the level of feature identity representa-
tions is more time-consuming than deciding on target
presence on the basis of a dimension-based salience
signal (Found & Müller, 1996; Krummenacher et al.,
2010). Accessing feature identity representations would
constitute an explanation for (at least part of) the overall RT
increase in the negative relative to the positive and neutral
mood conditions. The presumption that overall RTs and inter-
trial effects in the positive and neutral conditions would not
differ relies on previous findings showing that the average
neutral mood of most people is rather positive (Diener &
Diener, 1996; Isen, 1984) and that processing levels in
positive and neutral moods are therefore frequently the
same (Gasper & Clore, 2002; Navon, 1977). Furthermore,
the assumption is also in line with Ashby and colleagues’
(Ashby et al., 1999; Ashby et al., 2002) dopamine account,
which states that a moderate concentration of dopamine is
present in people in neutral affective states and that dopa-
mine concentration is only increased in positive affective
states.
Method
Participants
A group of 60 observers participated in the study. Of these,
20 observers were randomly assigned to each of the posi-
tive, negative, and neutral mood conditions; in each condi-
tion, 16 of the observers were female, and the age ranges
(with mean ages) were 19–29 (23.3)years in the positive,
19–29 (22.5)years in the negative, and 19–38 (24.8)years in
the neutral condition. All participants reported normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, including color vision. They
were paid at a rate of 10 Swiss francs (approximately $11)
per hour or received course credits.
Stimuli, apparatus, and task
The display consisted of an array of search items pre-
sented in cells (2.0° × 2.0° of visual angle) in an imag-
inary grid of 7 × 7 rows and columns (see Fig. 1). Item
positions were jittered by a maximum of 0.6° of visual
angle relative to the cell centers. The minimum (and
maximum) distances measured between the centers of
gravity of the display items were 1.0° (2.0°) horizontally
and vertically. The nontarget items were green vertical
bars, and the target items differed from nontargets by
either color (red or blue vertical bar) or orientation
(green bar tilted 45° to the left or right, relative to the
vertical). Figure 1 shows example displays of the four
possible target-present conditions; in target-absent trials
(not shown), all of the display items were green vertical
(nontarget) bars. On each trial, the target location was
randomly chosen from among the inner 5 × 5 matrix
cells, in order to keep the target–distractor feature con-
trasts comparable for all target locations (observers were
not informed of this restriction). Each search item sub-
tended 0.9° of visual angle in height and 0.2° in width,
and the item colors were equiluminant (1.6 cd/m2) green
(CIE x,y chromatic coordinates 0.311, 0.578), red (CIE
0.596, 0.358), and blue (CIE 0.148, 0.065). The back-
ground was black.
Stimulus presentation, timing, and response recording
were controlled by a Pentium PC running the Windows
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XP operating system and using the “Cogent 2000” toolbox
(www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php) for MATLAB (The
MathWorks Inc., Sherborn, MA). Displays were presented
on a 19-in. CRT monitor (Phillips Brilliance P202) with a
100-Hz screen refresh rate and a screen resolution of 1,280
× 1,024 pixels. Observers viewed the display from a dis-
tance of about 70 cm.
The observers’ task was to indicate, as quickly and
accurately as possible, whether or not a target item was
present in the display. Target-present and target-absent
responses were given manually, by pressing predefined
keys on a standard keyboard.
The experiment comprised a total of 564 trials,
divided into six blocks of 94 trials. In approximately
60% (or 336) of all trials, one of the nontarget items
was replaced by a (color or orientation) feature single-
ton target; the remaining 40% (or 228) of the trials were
target-absent trials. In each block, 48 (of the 56) target-
present trials were presented in such a way that a
minimum of eight (predefined) same-dimension, same-
feature; eight same-dimension, different-feature; and
eight different-dimension intertrial transition sequences
occurred. The sequence of presentation of the target-
present and target-absent trials was chosen randomly in
each block. The four target types (red, blue, left-tilted,
and right-tilted) were presented equally often.
Mood was induced using films. Participants watched a 3-
min film clip with a particular affective valence; additionally,
they were instructed to adopt the mood state experi-
enced by the film’s protagonist. The films were chosen
according to the Rottenberg et al. (2007) film-rating
catalogue: When Harry Met Sally (Reiner, Scheinman,
Stolt, & Nicolaides, 1989) was used to induce positive
(happy) mood, Return to Me (Tugend & Hunt, 2000) to
induce negative (sad) mood, and Sticks (a screensaver
available for download at http://uweb.cas.usf.edu/mood/
images/sticks.mov) to induce neutral mood. The neutral
condition was run as a baseline control.
Procedure
Prior to the visual search experiment proper, participants com-
pleted a block of 50 practice trials to become familiar with the
visual search task. After the familiarization block, the observers
watched a mood-inducing film clip and then completed
the visual search experiment. After watching the clip,
each observer rated it with respect to its affective va-
lence (1 0 very sad clip, 2 0 sad clip, 3 0 neutral clip,
4 0 happy clip, and 5 0 very happy clip). Furthermore,
participants rated their current mood following comple-
tion of the familiarization block (initial mood) and after
mood induct ion on a purpose-made f ive- i tem
Fig. 1 Schematic illustration of
the different search displays
used in the present study (top
row, displays containing a color
singleton target; bottom row,
displays containing an
orientation singleton target).
The nontargets and left- and
right-tilted targets were origi-
nally colored in green, and the
color target features were red
and blue
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questionnaire (1 0 very sad, 2 0 sad, 3 0 neutral, 4 0
happy, and 5 0 very happy).
Each (familiarization and experimental) trial started
with the presentation, for 500 ms, of a fixation point
(a circle with a diameter of 0.2° of visual angle).
Fixation was followed, for 200 ms, by a blank screen
and the onset of the search display, which remained
visible until the observer’s response (but for no longer
than 3,000 ms). Each response was followed by a
blank-screen intertrial interval of 500 ms and by the
next experimental trial.
Results
Exceedingly fast (below 200 ms) and slow (above
1,600 ms) RTs were excluded from the analysis (less
than 1% of all trials); error trials were also excluded
from the RT analysis. Data were analyzed using univar-
iate and repeated measures analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) and two-tailed t-tests; Bonferroni corrections
were applied where necessary.
Mood induction
The material check showed that the mean ratings of the
positive, negative, and neutral films scaled at 4.5 ([very]
happy), 1.4 ([very] sad), and 3.0 (neutral), respectively. The
mood induction was successful in that all of the individual
ratings were in the expected directions. The mean ratings of
initial and induced moods increased significantly [t(19) 0
2.6, p 0 .033] in the positive mood condition, from 3.7
(initial mood) to 4.1 (induced mood); decreased significant-
ly [t(19) 0 4.5, p < .001] in the negative mood condition,
from 3.4 to 2.4; and did not differ [3.3 and 3.2; t(19) < 1] in
the neutral control condition.
Reaction time intertrial effects
Reaction time intertrial analyses were conducted to
identify the levels (dimension-based salience or feature
identity; see Krummenacher et al., 2010) at which
search items were processed in the three mood condi-
tions and to examine the hypothesis that observers in a
negative mood process targets at the feature level, while
observers in a positive mood base their responses on the
presence of salience signals.
Three types of transitions across consecutive trials were
examined: repetition of both the target dimension and fea-
ture (referred to as same dimension, same feature: sDsF),
repetition of the target dimension and change of the target
feature (same dimension, different feature: sDdF), and
change of the target dimension (different dimension: dD).
Intertrial effects on RTs were analyzed in a mixed-measures
ANOVAwith the within-subjects factor Intertrial Transition
(sDsF, sDdF, or dD) and the between-subjects factor Mood
(positive, negative, or neutral). The ANOVA revealed the
two main effects to be significant. The main effect of inter-
trial transition [F(2, 114) 0 150.5, p < .001] indicated
reliable effects of the previous trial on the RT of the current
trial in all three mood conditions. The main effect of mood
[F(2, 57) 0 7.0, p 0 .002] arose due to differences in the
overall RTs of the three conditions: RTs were slowest in the
negative mood condition (470.6 ms), followed by RTs in the
neutral (415.0 ms) and positive (398.1 ms) mood conditions.
More importantly, the interaction between intertrial transi-
tion and mood was significant [F(4, 114) 0 3.5, p 0 .011],
showing that the magnitude of the intertrial effects depended
on the observer’s mood. Table 1 shows the magnitudes of
the RT costs associated with dimension and feature changes
in the three mood conditions. As predicted, RTs in all mood
conditions were significantly slower when the target dimen-
sion changed across consecutive trials relative to when it
was repeated (i.e., a dimension-based intertrial effect arising
from a comparison of dD vs. sDdF transitions; see Table 1).
By contrast, RTs increased significantly in feature-change as
compared to feature-repetition trials only in the negative
mood condition (i.e., a feature-based intertrial effect based
on a comparison of sDdF vs. sDsF transitions; see Table 1).1
Overall, the results can be taken as evidence that observers
in a negative mood access the level of feature representa-
tions to decide on the presence or absence of the target (see
Krummenacher et al., 2010) even though there is no need to
do so, as is demonstrated by observers in a positive or a
neutral mood.2
Theoretically it is possible, however, that feature-based
intertrial effects in the negative mood condition emerged
because of the fact that overall RTs were higher in the
1 The magnitude of the feature-based intertrial effect was about
13 ms; in absolute numbers, the effect seems moderately large,
and its significance was called into questioned by one of the
reviewers. Note, however, that the effect is statistically significant
[t(19) 0 3.0, p 0 .016], and comparable in magnitude to the
reliable feature-specific intertrial effects reported in Experiments
1 and 2 of Krummenacher et al. (2010).
2 As the interpretation of the intertrial data is partially based on the
absence of a reliable feature-based intertrial effect in the positive
(nonsignificant difference of 5.1 ms) and neutral (nonsignificant dif-
ference of 1.6 ms) mood conditions, a power analysis was conducted to
test the assumption that the power of the tests was sufficient to capture
potentially significant feature-based effects in those two conditions
(similar to the effect of 13.1 ms observed in the negative mood
condition). The power of the test (1 – β) was calculated using the
post-hoc option of the G*Power program (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007). The analysis revealed an effect size f, as defined by
Cohen (1988), of 0.71, and a power of .92 for the negative mood
condition. Thus, it can be concluded that the power of the test com-
paring the sDdF and sDsF conditions was sufficient to capture any
effects of cross-trial feature changes in all mood conditions.
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negative than in the positive and neutral mood condi-
tions. In order to rule out this possibility, the feature-
based intertrial effects were compared separately for the
faster versus the slower half of all RTs (based on mean
splits of the individual RTs) in all of the three mood
conditions. The results replicated the pattern of intertrial
effects of the overall RT analysis: The ANOVAs for both
the fast and the slow RTs revealed significant main
effects of intertrial transition [fast RTs, F(2, 114) 0
34.2; slow RTs, F(2, 114) 0 14.1; both ps < .001] and
of mood [fast RTs, F(2, 57) 0 4.8, p 0 .012; slow RTs, F
(2, 57) 0 9.7, p < .001], as well as significant interac-
tions [fast RTs, F(4, 114) 0 3.1, p 0 .019; slow RTs, F(4,
114) 0 3.0, p 0 .022]. Follow-up t-tests revealed statisti-
cally reliable dimension-based intertrial effects in all
mood groups for fast [positive, t(19) 0 2.9, p 0 .019;
neutral, t(19) 0 2.8, p 0 .021; negative, t(19) 0 3.1,
p 0 .013] as well as slow [positive, t(19) 0 3.0,
p 0 .014; neutral, t(19) 0 2.4, p 0 .050; negative,
t(19) 0 5.1, p < .001] RTs. Importantly, the feature-
based intertrial effects were statistically reliable in the
negative mood condition for fast [t(19) 0 2.9,
p 0 .019] as well as for slow [t(19) 0 2.5, p 0 .048)
RTs, while they were not statistically significant in the
positive and neutral mood conditions for either fast [pos-
itive, t(19) < 1; neutral, t(19) 0 1.0, p 0 .643] or slow
[ p o s i t i v e , t ( 1 9 ) 0 1 . 9 , p 0 . 1 3 7 ; n e u t r a l ,
t(19) < 1] RTs. On the basis of the present results, the
interpretation can be ruled out that the contrast between
statistically significant feature-based intertrial effects in
the negative mood condition and the absence of feature-
based effects in the positive and neutral mood conditions
is an effect of general response speed. Under the assump-
tion that the feature-based intertrial effects were due to
slow RTs, the feature-based effects would not be
expected to emerge for the fast RTs in the negative mood
condition; rather, they would be expected to appear for
the slow RTs in the positive and neutral mood condi-
tions. In sum, the reliable feature-based intertrial effects
observed in the negative mood condition are not due to,
but can be taken to reflect a cause (the processing of
feature identities) for the overall RT increase in the
negative relative to the positive and neutral mood
conditions.
Reaction times
The mean target-present and target-absent trial RTs in the
positive, negative, and neutral mood conditions (see Fig. 2)
were analyzed in a mixed-measures ANOVA with the
within-subjects factor Trial (present or absent) and the
between-subjects factor Mood (positive, negative, or neu-
tral). The main effect of mood was statistically significant
[F(2, 57) 0 9.7, p < .001]. In detail, negative mood condi-
tion RTs (539.7 ms) were significantly slower than the
positive [434.4 ms; t(38) 0 3.8, p 0 .002] and neutral
[462.7 ms; t(38) 0 2.7, p 0 .032] mood condition RTs,
while the positive and neutral mood condition RTs were
statistically not different [t(38) 0 1.8, p 0 .233].3
The main effect of trial [F(1, 57) 0 72.3, p < .001] and
the Mood × Trial interaction [F(2, 57) 0 5.0, p 0 .010]
were also statistically significant. Follow-up t-tests showed
that in all mood conditions, RTs in target-absent trials
were markedly slower than those in target-present trials
(positive, 454.4 ms vs. 414.4 ms, t(19) 0 4.4; neutral,
490.5 ms vs. 435.0 ms, t(19) 0 7.9; negative, 587.8 vs.
491.5 ms, t(19) 0 4.9; all ps < .001; see Fig. 2). The RT
differences for target-present relative to target-absent trials
Table 1 Intertrial effects on reaction times (RTs) for the positive, neutral, and negative mood conditions
Mean RTs (ms) Effect Size (ms)
Intertrial Transition Dimension (dD– sDdF) Feature (sDdF– sDsF)
sDsF sDdF dD Δ ms t(19) p Δ ms t(19) p
Positive 386.2 391.3 416.3 25.5 5.9 <.001 5.1 2.0 .123
Neutral 405.6 404.0 435.5 31.5 10.1 <.001 1.6 0.6 1.00
Negative 451.0 464.1 496.8 32.7 7.6 <.001 13.1 3.0 .016
Left-hand panel: RTs (in milliseconds) for the three intertrial transitions (sDsF, same dimension, same feature; sDdF, same dimension, different
feature; dD, different dimensions), separately for the three mood conditions (positive, neutral, and negative). Right-hand panel: Comparison of
dimension change (dD) and feature change (sDdF) RT costs (including t, df, and p values)
3 In order to show that the RT increase in the negative mood
condition was independent of the target dimension, an ANOVA with
the factors Target Identity (color or orientation) and Mood (positive,
neutral, or negative) was conducted. We found significant main
effects of mood [F(2, 57) 0 7.9, p 0 .001] and target identity
[F(1, 57) 0 164.4, p < .001], but no reliable interaction [F(2, 57) < 1].
In other words, RTs to color targets (434.4 ms) were faster than RTs to
orientation targets (459.5 ms); however, the processing times were affect-
ed by the observers’ mood independently of the target’s dimensional
definition.
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were compared across mood conditions (positive, 40.0 ms;
neutral, 55.5 ms; negative, 96.3 ms) and were found to be
larger in the negative than in the positive mood condition
[t(38) 0 2.6, p 0 .037], but statistically they were not
different in the negative and neutral mood conditions
[t(38) 0 2.0, p 0 .168] and in the positive and neutral
mood conditions [t(38) 0 1.4, p 0 .544]. (For an interpre-
tation, refer to the “Discussion” section below.)
Error rates
A univariate ANOVA of the overall error rates with the
between-subjects factor Mood (positive, negative, or
neutral) did not reveal a significant main effect [F(2,
57) 0 1.6, p 0 .217], although error rates in the positive
mood condition (4.4%) were slightly higher than those
in the negative (3.1%) and neutral (3.4%) mood con-
ditions. The slight increase in error rates in the positive
mood condition is in line with the assumptions of
Dreisbach (2006; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004), who
suggested that observers in a positive mood are more
easily distracted, and therefore produce higher error
rates, than observers in a negative or neutral mood.
Errors in target-present (misses) and target-absent (false
alarms) trials were analyzed in a mixed-measures
ANOVA with the within-subjects factor Error Type (miss
or false alarm) and the between-subjects factor Mood
(positive, negative, or neutral). Here, the main effect of
error type was statistically significant [F(1, 57) 0 20.4,
p < .001]: In all three mood conditions, false alarm rates
were higher than miss rates.
Discussion
In the present experiment, we demonstrated that the
mechanisms of feature-based attentional selection are
modulated by observers’ moods. The mean search RTs
of observers in a negative mood showed that processing
was slowed dramatically, as compared to positive or
neutral moods, while comparable RTs in the positive
and neutral mood conditions suggested equally efficient
processing. The processing differences between the neg-
ative and the positive and neutral mood conditions were
examined by analyses of the intertrial transition effects.
The intertrial analysis revealed that observers in posi-
tive and neutral moods, as predicted by previous stud-
ies (e.g., Found & Müller, 1996; Krummenacher et al.
2010), showed dimension-based, but no feature-based,
intertrial effects. By contrast, changing the target fea-
ture (within a dimension) incurred an RT cost in the
negative mood condition only. Dimension-based change
effects were expected in all conditions, as the presence
of salience activity in the modules processing either
color or orientation would need to be established by
a mechanism requiring the time-consuming shift of
attentional weight between dimensions in the case of
a dimension change across trials (Müller et al., 1995;
Müller et al., 2003). The presence of a salience acti-
vation signaling the presence of a singleton target in
one of the two target-defining dimensions was suffi-
cient to trigger a target-present response in the positive
and neutral mood conditions. By contrast, RT costs
associated with a feature change suggested that the
target item was processed at the level of feature iden-
tity in participants with a negative mood (see
Krummenacher et al., 2010). Rather than relying on
the presence of salience activation for a speeded re-
sponse, as did observers in a positive or neutral mood,
participants in a negative mood accessed the target’s
featural value for a thorough analysis of its identity.
The present findings are in line with the results of
previous experiments investigating the effects of affect
on information selection (e.g., Basso et al., 1996;
Derryberry & Reed, 1998; Gasper & Clore, 2002;
Rowe et al., 2007), which showed that participants in
positive (and neutral) moods employ a spatial spotlight
with a wide scope and process global (low-resolution)
aspects of visual stimuli, while participants in negative
moods use an attentional spotlight with a narrow focus
and process local (high-resolution) aspects of visual
information. Note also that, although our results repli-
cated the finding of a fixed pattern between (positive
and negative) affect and (global and local) processing
styles with dedicated (wide and narrow) foci of atten-
tion, they are also in keeping with the findings of
300
400
500
600
RTs
[ms]
positive neutral negative
Mood condition
target-present trials target-absent trials
Fig. 2 Reaction times (RTs) and standard errors of the means (in
milliseconds) for target-present and target-absent trials, presented sep-
arately for the positive, neutral, and negative mood conditions. The
brackets indicate statistically significant (p < .05) differences
Atten Percept Psychophys (2013) 75:41–52 49
Huntsinger (in press) and of Gable and Harmon-Jones
(2008, 2010), who suggested that the links between these
variables are flexible. Huntsinger found a wide or a narrow
scope of attention, respectively, associated with positive or
negative mood in conditions in which observers were made to
adopt a global focus only. When observers adopted a local
focus, or when neither a global nor a local focus was induced,
this relationship pattern was reversed or abolished.
Furthermore, Gable and Harmon-Jones (2008, 2010) showed
that, under conditions of high approachmotivation (i.e., with a
desire to obtain an attractive reward), positive mood could
also result in a narrow attentional focus. However, we did not
specify a particular (global or local) focus in our experiment.
This means that in our experimental context, the adoption of a
general global focus was reinforced (e.g., Kimchi, 1992;
Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; Navon, 1977; Navon & Norman,
1983), and therefore positive and negative affect in our exper-
iment were conflated with the “usually dominant [global] way
of viewing the world” (Huntsinger, in press, p.4). Also, we
induced emotional states with low approach motivation by
simply exposing observers to film clips with a positive, neu-
tral, or negative emotional valence. Thus, we created exactly
the conditions under which Huntsinger (in press) and Gable
and Harmon-Jones (2008, 2010) predicted fixed patterns of
narrowed and enlarged spotlights in participants with, respec-
tively, negative and positive mood.
The pattern of RT intertrial effects provides evidence that
the more time-consuming access of feature value represen-
tations in observers with negative relative to positive and
neutral moods is the main source of the increase in the
overall RTs of observers with a negative affective state.
However, the significantly more pronounced difference be-
tween target-present and target-absent trial RTs in observers
in a negative as compared to a positive or neutral mood
constitutes another source of the overall RT increase. Slower
search RTs in target-absent than in target-present trials have
been reported repeatedly in feature search tasks.
Krummenacher and colleagues (e.g., Krummenacher et al.,
2010; Krummenacher et al., 2001, 2002) speculated that
longer absent-trial RTs are due to observers’ refraining from
responding during a short additional interval at about the
time that a (target-present) response is usually initiated. This
delay could allow for the processing of salience activations
with a low probability of signaling the target, and thus
reduce the likelihood of missing a target. Chun and Wolfe
(1996), in an analysis of the mechanism underlying target-
absent responses, argued that observers flexibly shift a
threshold that differentiates salience signals with a given
probability of indicating a target item from salience activa-
tions that are unlikely to signal a target. As an example, the
threshold is lowered as an immediate response to a target
miss error. Lowering the threshold results in a larger number
of items being sampled as potential targets and is mirrored
in an RT increase. The present results suggest that observ-
ers in a negative mood consistently use a lower “target
candidate” threshold than do observers in a positive
mood. A lower threshold for target candidate signals would
be reflected by increased search RT variance in the negative as
compared to the positive mood conditions. This prediction
was tested in additional analyses of the RTstandard deviations
across mood conditions. Standard deviations in the negative
mood condition (119.4ms) differed significantly from those in
the positive [73.9 ms; t(38) 0 4.5, p < .001] and neutral
[84.2 ms; t(38) 0 3.5, p 0 .004] mood conditions. [The
standard deviations of the positive and neutral mood condi-
tions did not differ statistically: t(38) 0 1.8, p 0 .230.] With
error rates being statistically the same in both positive and
negative mood conditions, the RT difference suggests that the
threshold adaptation in negativemoodwas required to achieve
the instructed level of accuracy.
In previous work, participants in a negative mood have
been described as having a narrower attentional focus
than do observers in a positive mood (Christianson &
Loftus, 1990; Derryberry & Reed, 1998; Derryberry &
Tucker, 1994; Easterbrook, 1959; Fredrickson, 2004;
Rowe et al., 2007). A narrow focus of attention could
be the consequence of participants’ need to process the
relevant information at the feature level in order to
access the target’s identity. Conversely, a narrow focus
could also be the very reason why objects are processed
thoroughly (i.e., at the feature level). Lavie (1995; Lavie
& Tsal, 1994) argued that cognitive load determines the
amount of information that is processed. In low-load
conditions, irrelevant distractor information is processed
together with relevant target information, entailing inter-
ference. In connection with negative mood, a narrow
focus of the attention spotlight might result in a highly
efficient rejection of distractor information outside of the
focus, and, as a consequence, result in the capacity to
process relevant information at the level of feature
representations.
In conclusion, the difference in overall RTs in fea-
ture search between participants in a positive, a neu-
tral, or a negative mood can be explained by the level
of information processing: Observers in a positive
mood are happy to base their response on the presence
of a salience difference, while participants in a nega-
tive mood base their responses on the identity of the
target item.
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